




THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
QUEENSLAND’S RECENT (LEGAL) WAR 
ON ‘BIKIES’ 
ANTHONY GRAY* 
The Queensland government has responded to a perceived ‘criminal problem’ 
with motorcycle clubs by directly naming and declaring 26 motorcycle clubs. It 
supplements earlier legislation that provided for a court to make such an order, 
upon defined criteria. The effect of the declaration is that it becomes a criminal 
offence for participants in the declared organisation to associate. The legislation 
provides for minimum mandatory gaol terms for various offences, including the 
act of associating. This article argues that there are serious constitutional 
questions surrounding such legislation, including on the basis of Chapter III of 
the Constitution, and the extent to which a court’s institutional integrity is 
compromised by legislation of this nature. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In October 2013, the Queensland Parliament passed a raft of legislative 
changes with the ostensible purpose of ‘cracking down’ on groups thought to 
present a challenge to public safety. For the purposes of this article, and for 
ease of reference, the legislation will be referred to as the ‘anti-bikie laws’. 
Clearly the primary target of these laws is motorcycle clubs. Passage of these 
laws quickly followed a well-publicised violent altercation between members 
of rival motorcycle clubs on the Gold Coast, and the shooting of a member of 
a motorcycle club at a Gold Coast shopping mall. Legal groups such as the 
Queensland Law Society and the Queensland Bar Association have expressed 
serious concern with the legislation, including the lack of consultation before 
it was introduced, as well as the substantive content of the provisions. The 
Queensland government has responded by deriding some members of the 
judiciary and legal profession as living in ivory towers,1 and by claiming that 
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some criminal lawyers are part of the ‘criminal machine’.2 Subsequently, 
defamation proceedings have been issued against the Queensland Premier and 
Attorney-General. In summary, the introduction of these laws has taken place 
in a highly charged political environment with strongly held views on both 
sides, with the government claiming that such laws are necessary to stamp out 
criminal behaviour in the State, and civil libertarians and lawyers expressing 
grave concern with the substance of the provisions and the precedent being 
set.  
This article considers arguments regarding the constitutionality of aspects of 
the new laws. A High Court challenge to the new laws was filed on 19 March 
2014. Part II of the article summarises the essence of the new regime. It will 
be seen that there are many possible constitutional arguments in relation to the 
new laws. Some of these have been examined elsewhere,3 and will not be 
discussed again here. In Part III, a constitutional argument is mounted against 
aspects of the new laws, drawing on past High Court and state Supreme Court 
precedent in this area of constitutional law. 
II THE LEGAL ‘WAR’ ON BIKIES 
A The Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) 
It is first necessary to explain briefly the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 
(Qld) (‘the Act’) which was passed by the previous State government4 and 
became operational in 2011. Broadly, section 8(1) of that legislation provided 
for the Police Commissioner to apply to the Supreme Court for an order that a 
particular organisation be declared to be a ‘criminal organisation’ under the 
Act. Section 10(1) provided that the court might make the order if it was 
satisfied that: (a) the respondent was an organisation; (b) members of the 
organisation associate for the purpose of engaging in (‘or conspiring to 
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engage in’) serious criminal activity; and (c) the organisation presented an 
unacceptable risk to the community.5 
The main purpose of obtaining a declaration that the organisation was a 
criminal organisation becomes clear upon reading Part 3 of the Act dealing 
with control orders. Section 18(1) of the Act empowers the court to make a 
control order against a person if satisfied that the person (a) is, or has been, a 
member of a declared criminal organisation, (b) engages in, or has engaged in, 
serious criminal activity, and (c) associates for the purpose of engaging in, or 
conspiring to engage in, serious criminal activity.6 The content of the control 
order is a matter for the court, but may include matters such as restrictions on 
the person associating with other members of the criminal organisation or 
with other nominated individuals or class of individuals, and restrictions on 
the possession of weapons, or on employment options. Contravention of a 
control order can attract a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment for 
a first offence, or five years for a subsequent offence.7 
The Act was clearly drafted in light of the High Court decision in South 
Australia v Totani,8 where six members of the High Court declared provisions 
of that State’s anti-association laws invalid. This case will be considered in 
more detail below; however, two key differences between the South 
Australian legislation (which was held to be invalid) and the Queensland 
legislation (which was found by the High Court to be valid)9 were that: (a) in 
the case of the South Australian law, it was the Attorney-General, and not the 
court, who was empowered to declare the organisation to be criminal; and (b) 
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valid in Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 87 ALJR 458 
(‘Pompano’). It is not necessary to re-enter this field for present purposes. 
7 Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) s 24. 
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in the case of the South Australian law, the court had no discretion in making 
the control order sought. Rather, the court was required to make the order 
upon satisfaction that the person the subject of the order was a member of a 
declared organisation. In contrast, the 2009 Queensland Act provides that the 
court has discretion as to whether or not to make the control order, based on a 
number of factors. This helps to explain the different outcomes in the High 
Court decisions of Totani and of Pompano. 
Despite the Queensland government passing the Criminal Organisation Act 
2009 (Qld), and being willing to defend its constitutionality in the High Court, 
it has never sought or obtained a declaration against an organisation, or a 
control order against any of the organisation’s members, under its own 
legislation. 
In response to some high-profile altercations involving members of 
motorcycle clubs, the Queensland government moved in October 2013 to ‘get 
tougher’ on motorcycle clubs, based on a suspicion that they were fronts for 
illegal activity including money laundering, extortion and drug trafficking. It 
passed a raft of new laws and amendments to existing ones. The most 
noteworthy are summarised below. 
B The Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) 
First, Parliament passed the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld). Its most important provision is its 
introduction of the Criminal Code (Criminal Organisation) Regulation 2013 
in Schedule 1. This regulation declares 26 named organisations to be ‘criminal 
organisations’ for the purposes of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). There is no 
explanation in either the legislation or the explanatory memorandum of the 
basis upon which these 26 organisations were chosen. There is perhaps some 
guidance found in section 38 of the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld), which indicates that when 
recommending that an organisation be declared in future, the Minister should 
have regard to a range of factors.10 
In other words, the Queensland Parliament effectively bypassed the existing 
mechanism in the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) (which, having 
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never been used, did not permit the government to plausibly argue that a court 
had identified practical difficulties with the legislation or loopholes). It 
provided now for a direct declaration by Parliament, rather than a declaration 
by a court. More commentary on this change is provided below.  
The executive declaration has critical consequences in its interaction with 
other provisions of the Act. These consequences include the following:  
(a) The creation of an offence of a participant in a ‘criminal organisation’ 
being knowingly present in a public place with at least two other 
participants, the offence attracting a minimum term of imprisonment 
of six months and a maximum of three years.11 The purpose of the 
presence is immaterial to the commission of the offence; 
(b) The creation of an aggravating factor in relation to a handful of 
specified offences in the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld), that aggravating factor being 
that an offender was a member of a ‘criminal organisation’. 
Specifically, minimum mandatory sentences apply if a member of a 
criminal organisation commits certain offences;12 
(c) The creation of a reverse onus for bail applications; bail is presumed 
refused to a member of a criminal organisation charged with an 
offence;13 
(d) The application of provisions of the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 
(Qld) providing for the Chair of the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission to call a person in for a meeting or order them to 
produce documents. The defence of ‘reasonable excuse’ for failing to 
do so is a defence, but it is expressly stated that a person’s fear of 
injury to themselves or to another, or fear of damage or loss of 
property, is not a reasonable excuse for failure to answer questions or 
produce documents. Failure to do what is required is punishable by a 
court as a contempt, with minimum mandatory penalties for second or 
subsequent offences;14 
                                                 
11 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 60A(1), introduced at the time of the anti-association 
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12 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) ss 43–47. 
13 Ibid s 4. On the presumption of innocence, see Anthony Gray, ‘Constitutionally Protecting 
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14 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) ss 14–15, 21. 
Mandatory minimum penalties for contempt in this context are, for a second offence, two and 
a half years’ gaol, and for a third or subsequent offence, five years’ gaol: s 199(8B) of the 
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(e) The permission given to police to search a member of a criminal 
organisation without the need for a warrant;15 
(f) The allowed segregation of a person whilst in prison;16 
(g) The fact that a person may be required to wear a monitoring device or 
that such a device may be installed in their home if they are on parole 
or subject to a community-based order;17 and 
(h) Significant restrictions on the ability of a member of a declared 
organisation to work in particular industries.18 
The other significant change made was in relation to sentencing. It has already 
been noted above that membership of a declared organisation is seen as an 
aggravating circumstance in relation to a small number of defined offences, 
and a system of minimum mandatory sentencing is applied to those offences, 
pursuant to the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Act 2013 
(Qld). However, another Act passed at the same time, the Vicious Lawless 
Association Disestablishment Act 2013 (Qld) (‘VLAD Act’), imposes a much 
more widespread, and serious, system of minimum mandatory sentencing 
with respect to participants in declared organisations. 
C The Vicious Lawless Association Disestablishment 
Act 2013 (Qld) 
Two important definitions help shape the scope of the VLAD Act. The first is 
that of ‘participant’. This is someone who asserts, declares or advertises in 
any way membership of an association, one who seeks to be a member of an 
association, attends more than one meeting of an association, or takes part in 
the affairs of the association.19 The Act then defines a ‘vicious lawless 
associate’ as a person who (a) commits a declared offence; (b) is a 
‘participant’ within the meaning of section 4, and (c) commits the offence 
pursuant to the objects of the association.20 It is a defence for the person to 
                                                                                                                    
Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld) (inserted by s 30 of the Criminal Law (Criminal 
Organisation Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld)). See also Criminal Law (Criminal 
Organisations Disruption) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) ss 28–40. 
15 Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) s 54. 
16 Ibid s 14. 
17 Ibid s 16. 
18 Ibid ss 57–67 (electrician), ss 128–133 (building and construction), ss 139–143 (racing 
industry) and s 179 (tow truck industry). 
19 VLAD Act s 4. 
20 Ibid s 5(1). 
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show that the organisation does not have as one of its purposes the 
commission of declared offences.21 Schedule 1 of the Act contains a list of 
‘declared offences’. These range from the very serious (murder, rape, torture, 
serious assault, grievous bodily harm) to the relatively trivial (possession of 
illegal drugs). 
The key provision is section 7. It provides that in sentencing a ‘vicious 
lawless associate’ for a declared offence, the court must impose a sentence of 
imprisonment of 15 years, as well as sentencing for the actual crime 
committed. The two sentences must be applied cumulatively, not 
concurrently.22 The 15-year mandatory period must be served entirely in a 
corrective services facility.23 This minimum period increases to 25 years if the 
person was an office bearer of the association at the time the offence was 
committed, and is in addition to the sentence for the actual crime committed. 
Again, this 25-year period must be served entirely in a corrective services 
facility.24 If there was any doubt, section 8 reiterates that the offender is not 
eligible for parole during the 15 or 25 years of imprisonment mandated by 
section 7. 
For example, consider a person who is a participant in the affairs of a declared 
organisation because they wear the colours of such an organisation. They are 
found with a small quantity of marijuana in their possession. If there is 
evidence that this possession occurs pursuant to the objects of the association, 
and they cannot show that the organisation does not have a criminal purpose 
as at least one of its purposes, they must be sentenced to at least 15 years’ 
imprisonment in a Queensland gaol, and 25 years’ imprisonment if they 
happened to be the secretary of the declared organisation. The sentence cannot 
be mitigated by a court and must be served entirely within a correctional 
facility. 
Arguments that might be used to invalidate the legislation as being contrary to 
the requirements of the Constitution will now be considered. Arguments 
regarding the constitutionality of the laws are distinct from arguments 
regarding: the utility of the above laws in tackling crime; whether the laws 
were introduced as populist law and order measures rather than being justified 
by the prevalence of crime that could not be captured using pre-existing laws; 
what the precise extent of law-breaking within the declared organisations 
actually is; and whether the laws were preceded by sufficient consultation 
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23 Ibid s 7(1)(b). 
24 Ibid s 7(1)(c). 
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with relevant stakeholders. All of those issues are separate from, and 
irrelevant to, questions of constitutionality 
III FOUR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE 
‘ANTI-BIKIE’ LAWS 
It was in 1956 that the High Court began to develop its Chapter III 
jurisprudence, discerning from the structure of the Constitution an intention to 
divide judicial, legislative and executive power. This was probably an indirect 
reflection of Montesquieuan separation of powers theory developed in the 18th 
century which was to be so pivotal to the drafting of the United States 
Constitution, and which in turn influenced Australia’s founding fathers. This 
separation of power would generally25 make unconstitutional a law which 
conferred power that was non-judicial in nature on a Chapter III court. The 
corollary was that it would similarly be unconstitutional for a law to confer 
judicial power on a non-Chapter III court.26 This fundamental principle 
requires clarification of two issues — the scope of a ‘Chapter III’ court; and 
the nature of judicial power (and, obviously, non-judicial power). The 
response to the first issue is relatively settled — we understand that a ‘Chapter 
III’ court embraces federal courts established pursuant to the Commonwealth 
Constitution and we understand the notion of state courts with federal 
jurisdiction and the nature of an integrated court hierarchy in Australia, such 
that the notion of a Chapter III court includes state courts and some tribunals.  
It is also clear that the question of whether a body is a ‘court’ is a question of 
substance, not form. Clearly, Parliament cannot plausibly argue that a body is 
a court, for instance, simply because it is called a ‘court’, if it is not ‘in 
substance’ a court.27 However, it is not entirely clear what minimum 
requirements must exist in order that a body can in substance be called a 
court. This is an issue that has been relatively sparsely developed by the High 
Court to date. However, the Court has confirmed that a necessary 
characteristic of a court (at least, a superior court) is that it have power to 
correct jurisdictional error committed by a lower court, such that a statute 
purporting to remove this power is offensive to the Constitution.28 It is also a 
                                                 
25 Exceptions would subsequently develop to this principle, including the personae designata 
exception: Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57. 
26 R v Kirby; Ex Parte Boilermakers Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 (‘Boilermakers’). 
27 Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe, ‘Broadening the Reach of Chapter III: The Institutional 
Integrity of State Courts and the Constitutional Limits of State Legislative Power’ (2012) 36 
Melbourne University Law Review 175, 178. 
28 Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, 566 (French CJ, 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) (‘Kirk’). 
2014 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ‘WAR’ ON BIKIES 59 
necessary characteristic of a court that it be able to provide reasons for its 
decisions.29 
The second issue that logically arises from the Boilermakers decision is what 
is meant by ‘judicial power’. The High Court has been notoriously reluctant to 
precisely articulate what is meant by judicial power.30 In an early case, 
Griffith CJ stated that it meant: 
the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide 
controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, 
whether the rights relate to life, limb or property. The exercise of this power 
does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and 
authoritative decision … is called upon to take action.31  
The High Court has confirmed that one feature of the exercise of judicial 
power is the kind of process that is generally followed in the tribunal. This 
means that if a court is required,32 or authorised,33 to use processes that are 
different from those traditionally considered to be key features of a ‘judicial 
process’, the court may find that the departures are sufficient to deny the 
exercise of the power its judicial character, potentially creating Chapter III 
constitutional difficulties.34 Consistently with this, a law which removes from 
a body a traditional characteristic of the exercise of judicial power may be 
such that it denies the process the character of a judicial process, again 
potentially creating constitutional difficulties.35  
                                                 
29 Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 (‘Wainohu’). 
30 Forge v Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 
(Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) (‘Forge’). 
31 Huddart Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. 
32 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 355 (Gummow and Crennan JJ); Totani (2010) 
242 CLR 1, 157 (Crennan and Bell JJ); International Finance Trust v New South Wales Crime 
Commission (2009) 240 CLR 319, 353 (French CJ) (‘International Finance Trust’). 
33 Chu Kheng Lim v Commonwealth (1992) 176 CLR 1, 26–7 (Brennan, Deane, Dawson JJ); 
Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208–9 (Gaudron J); Leeth v Commonwealth 
(1992) 174 CLR 455, 470 (Mason CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ). 
34 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 329 (Gleeson CJ), 356 (Gummow and 
Crennan JJ); Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 580–1 (French CJ Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell JJ). 
35 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181. There is a vast literature. A sample includes: Ratnapala and 
Crowe, above n 27; Fiona Wheeler, ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and 
Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law 
Review 248; Fiona Wheeler, ‘Due Process, Judicial Power and Chapter III in the New High 
Court’ (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205; Will Bateman, ‘Procedural Due Process under the 
Australian Constitution’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law Review 411; Christine Parker, ‘Protection of 
Judicial Process as an Implied Constitutional Principle’ (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 341; 
Wendy Lacey, ‘Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees Under Chapter 
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Traditional characteristics of a body having judicial power have typically 
included an independent and impartial tribunal. Therefore a court cannot be 
given powers that would lead observers to suspect that the court was not 
independent and unbiased.36 In other words, it cannot be given powers (or 
have powers removed) that would serve to undermine its ‘institutional 
integrity’.37 The High Court has stated that typical characteristics of a judicial 
process include an open court with public hearing,38 the requirement of 
natural justice,39 an adversarial process,40 the giving of reasons for 
decisions,41 and the requirement that the allegations the court is asked to hear 
are sufficiently specific.42 The above might be neatly summarised as the 
requirement that a court process accord those involved ‘procedural fairness’.43 
On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the strictures of the 
Boilermakers principle still do not apply in the same way at state level as they 
do at federal level. The High Court was at pains to emphasise this once again 
in Pompano. Though most of the recent use of Chapter III principles has been 
in relation to state laws, and state laws were invalidated in cases such as 
Totani, International Finance Trust and Wainohu, it must be conceded that at 
state level there is nothing necessarily constitutionally obnoxious about the 
fact that powers essentially similar in nature are given to the judiciary and the 
legislature. 
                                                                                                                    
III of the Constitution’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57; Rebecca Welsh, ‘A Path to 
Purposive Formalism: Interpreting Chapter III for Judicial Independence and Impartiality’ 
(2013) 39(1) Monash University Law Review 66; Brendan Gogarty and Benedict Bartl, ‘Tying 
Kable Down: The Uncertainty about the Independence and Impartiality of State Courts 
following Kable v DPP (NSW) and Why It Matters’ (2009) 32(1) University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 75. 
36 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 98 (Toohey J), 107 
(Gaudron J), 117 (McHugh J), 134 (Gummow J) (‘Kable’); Ebner v Official Trustee (2000) 
205 CLR 337, 344–5 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 362–3 (Gaudron J), 
373 (Kirby J). 
37 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 67 (Gleeson CJ), 76 (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ), 122 
(Kirby J); Wainohu (2010) 243 CLR 181, 206 (French CJ and Kiefel JJ), 229 (Gummow, 
Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); Pompano (2013) 87 ALJR 458, 477 (French CJ), 487 (Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), 498 (Gageler J).  
38 Russell v Russell (1976) 134 CLR 495. 
39 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 359 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
40 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 76 (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ), with whom Callinan J 
(at 136) and Heydon J (at 150) agreed. 
41 Wainohu (2010) 243 CLR 181, 208–9 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 226 (Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan and Bell JJ). 
42 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531, 559 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
43 Wainohu (2011) 232 CLR 181, 208–9 (French CJ and Kiefel JJ), 226 (Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon, and Bell JJ); Pompano (2013) 87 ALJR 458, 477 (French CJ), 500 (Gageler J); 
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. 
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It will now be considered whether the anti-bikie laws might be challenged on 
the basis that they infringe these Chapter III requirements. 
A major feature of the Queensland government’s anti-bikie laws is the direct 
legislative declaration of 26 named motorcycle clubs as ‘criminal 
organisations’ in the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) 
Amendment Act 2013 (Qld). The very serious consequences of this for 
members or participants in such organisations, and their families, have been 
noted above. 
It is important to contrast these amending provisions with the pre-existing 
provisions of the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) which, although the 
provisions of this Act have not been used, provides in section 10 that a court 
can make a declaration that an organisation is a criminal organisation. 
At the very least, this situation raises concerns regarding the separation of 
powers, since the power of declaration has been given on the one hand to a 
court, and at the same time it is exercised by the legislature. The question 
arises of the true nature of the power to declare an organisation to be criminal. 
If it is judicial in nature, then the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations 
Disruption) Amendment Act 2013 (Qld) appears to be an unacceptable 
example of the legislature purporting to exercise judicial power. If it is 
legislative in nature, then the relevant provisions of the Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) would appear to be invalid, as conferring a non-
judicial power on a judicial body.44 (This latter point is subject to further 
argument below.) Further doubts are created when the decisions of the High 
Court in Totani and Pompano are recalled. In the former case, where a 
member of the executive made the relevant declaration, the law was declared 
invalid; in the latter case, where the court made the declaration, the law was 
declared valid. It will be necessary to consider the legislation invalidated in 
Totani and validated in Pompano in more detail to see what light it and the 
decisions can shed on the current issue.  
                                                 
44 In making this argument, it must be conceded that some muddying of the waters can occur 
and that sometimes powers can be classified in more than one way: Stephen McDonald, 
‘Involuntary Detention and the Separation of Judicial Power’ (2007) 35 Federal Law Review 
25, 67. There is also the argument regarding whether the question of separation of powers 
should be answered in a formalistic way — with careful definitions of legislative, executive 
and judicial power that are mutually exclusive — or a functional way, acknowledging the 
great difficulty in neatly establishing a dividing line between the various types of power and 
applying a flexible test that takes into account the reason for the divide. See on this debate 
Thomas Merrill, ‘The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers’ (1991) Supreme 
Court Review 225; William Gwyn, ‘The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the 
Federal Courts’ (1989) 57 George Washington Law Review 474. 
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Four specific arguments against the constitutionality of the 2013 changes will 
now be considered. All arguments are sourced from the requirements of 
Chapter III of the Constitution, and the idea that a court may not be given 
powers, or be denied powers, that undermine its independence and/or 
institutional integrity. The first argument is that the changes are inconsistent 
with the reasoning of the High Court in Totani (based on Chapter III). The 
second is that the nature of the power to declare an organisation to be criminal 
is judicial rather than executive or legislative in nature, so an Act purporting 
to reflect the legislature exercising such a power is offensive to Chapter III 
because it interferes with the court’s institutional integrity. The third is that 
the legislation, by obliging the court to act upon the declaration, so interferes 
with its obligation to provide fair process so as to be offensive to Chapter III 
because of its offensiveness to institutional integrity. The fourth is that the 
mandatory minimum sentencing aspect of the 2013 changes is offensive to the 
requirements of Chapter III, despite a 2013 High Court decision to the 
contrary. 
A South Australia v Totani 
Section 10(1) of the Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) 
empowered the State Attorney-General, upon application by the Police 
Commissioner, to declare an organisation criminal if satisfied that (a) 
members of the organisation associated for the purpose of planning, 
supporting or engaging in criminal activity; and (b) the organisation 
represented a risk to public safety.45 Section 14(1) then stated that a court 
might, on application by the Police Commissioner, make a control order 
against a person if the court was satisfied that the person was a member of a 
declared organisation. The control order had to prohibit that person from 
associating with other members of the organisation, and could deal with other 
matters such as placing limits on association with other individuals, limits on 
weapon ownership etc. It was an offence, punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment, to breach a control order.46 
                                                 
45 The Serious and Organised Crime (Control) Act 2008 (SA) s 10(3) (now amended) set out 
matters to which the Attorney-General was to have regard in deciding whether or not to make 
the declaration, including information suggesting a link between the organisation and serious 
criminal activity, any criminal convictions of current or former members and those who 
associated or who had associated with members, and any other information suggesting that 
current or former members of the organisation or those who associated or who had associated 
with members of the organisation had been or were involved in serious criminal activity 
directly or indirectly. 
46 Ibid s 22I. It was also an offence for a person to associate on at least six occasions in 12 
months with someone who was the subject of a control order, in circumstances where the 
person knew of or was reckless as to the existence of the order (ss 35(1)(b), (2)). 
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By a majority of 2:1 in the South Australian Supreme Court and by 6:1 in the 
High Court, aspects of the above legislation were held to be invalid, being 
contrary to the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution. 
Some aspects of the judgment of the majority in the Supreme Court decision 
should be noted. Whilst the High Court did not accept all of the reasoning 
employed by the majority, several members47 noted without disapproval the 
aspect of the reasoning of Bleby J (for the majority) that identified four 
elements to be established in order to obtain a control order under that Act: 
(1) Members of the organisation of which the defendant to the application 
for a control order is alleged to be a member associate for the purpose 
of planning, facilitating, supporting or engaging in serious criminal 
activity; 
(2) The organisation represents a risk to public safety in the State; 
(3) The declaration is made; and 
(4) The defendant is a member of the organisation the subject of the 
declaration.48 
Bleby J, with whom Kelly J agreed, reasoned that the first three of these four 
steps were carried out by the executive, and these were the most significant of 
the steps. This meant that the process by which a person was deprived of the 
entitlement to associate with whom they wished, upon pain of imprisonment 
for up to five years, lacked necessary procedural safeguards. These included 
the entitlement to contest several matters that might be contentious, and to 
respond to the government’s case. The government was attempting to 
unacceptably and significantly control the outcome of a judicial process, 
significantly compromising the court’s institutional integrity.49 Bleby J 
                                                 
47 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 60 (Gummow J), 76 (Hayne J), 153 (Crennan and Bell JJ). 
48 Totani v South Australia (2009) 105 SASR 244, 280. 
49 Ibid 280–1, 283. Members of the High Court expressed partial agreement with this reasoning 
in Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 35 (French CJ), 61 (Gummow J), 76 (Hayne J), 153 (Crennan 
and Bell JJ). However, members of the Court disagreed with the suggestion that the Attorney-
General’s decision to declare was effectively unreviewable (Gummow J at 62, Hayne J at 77, 
Crennan and Bell JJ at 153). They also disagreed that, in assessing Chapter III compatibility, 
it was a matter of weighing the relative size and complexity of tasks undertaken by the 
executive relative to the judiciary (French CJ at 36, Hayne J at 79–80), and disagreed with 
concerns raised regarding the use of ‘criminal intelligence’ (French CJ at 36, Gummow J 
at 61, Crennan and Bell JJ at 153). 
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suggested that the outcome might have been different if the court were the 
body with the power to make the declaration.50 
The High Court noted that the legislation required the court to make a 
decision that was largely pre-ordained by the executive declaration.51 The 
executive provided an essential circumstance for the making of the control 
order, a fact which distinguished this case from precedent such as Thomas v 
Mowbray and Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld)52 where the court’s discretion 
was essentially unconstrained and was not based on an essential finding by a 
member of the executive.53 As Crennan and Bell JJ put it: 
The conditions upon which the Court must make a control order require the 
Court to give effect to the determination of the Executive in the declaration 
(which implements the legislative policy), without undertaking any 
independent curial determination, or adjudication of the claim or premise of 
an application for a control order by the Commissioner of Police, that a 
particular defendant poses risks in terms of the objects of the Act. This has 
the effect of rendering the Court an instrument of the Executive, which 
undermines its independence.54  
French CJ noted that the executive declaration was not accompanied by 
reasons, and could not be challenged in court. It was based on an executive 
determination of the guilt of a person who may not be before the court.55 This 
was incompatible with the requirements of Chapter III, in particular the 
requirement of decisional independence. Several members of the Court 
expressed concern that the exercise of the power was independent of a 
determination that the person the subject of the order had ever engaged, or 
was likely to engage, in criminal conduct.56 Hayne J noted: 
[U]pon the motion of the Executive, the Court is required to create new 
norms of conduct, that apply to a particular member of a class of persons 
who is chosen by the Executive, on the footing that the Executive has 
decided that some among the class (who may or may not include the 
                                                 
50 Totani v South Australia (2009) 105 SASR 244, 281 (with whom Kelly J agreed). A feature 
of the Queensland version of anti-association legislation, the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 
(Cth), was that the court had the power to declare the organisation to be a criminal 
organisation, based on criteria enshrined in the Act. All members of the High Court validated 
this legislation: Pompano (2013) 87 ALJR 458. 
51 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 21 (French CJ). 
52 (2004) 223 CLR 575 (‘Fardon’). 
53 Ibid 66 (Gummow J), 89 (Hayne J), 158 (Crennan and Bell JJ). 
54 Ibid 160. 
55 Ibid 21 (French CJ). 
56 Ibid 28 (French CJ), 58 (Gummow J), 84–5 (Hayne J), 159 (Crennan and Bell JJ), 165 
(Kiefel J). 
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defendant) associate for particular kinds of criminal purposes. It is not the 
business of the courts, acting at the behest of the executive, to create such 
norms of conduct without inquiring about what the subject of that norm has 
done, or may do in the future. To be required to do so is repugnant to the 
institutional integrity of the courts.57 
The legislation gave the neutral colour of judicial proceedings to something 
that was, in essence, an executive action.58 Crennan and Bell JJ in Totani 
noted that sometimes a state court could be required to act on the basis of a 
factum determined by the executive, and that this may be consistent with 
Chapter III requirements. However, this was a question of fact and degree, 
and a significant confinement of the court’s adjudicative powers could 
indicate an intention to conscript the court into the execution of an executive 
or legislative plan.59 The latter was the case here, in that the court was 
essentially required to implement a legislative policy without any independent 
curial determination or adjudication of the premise of the application — that 
the control order would assist in meeting the objects of the Act.60 Kiefel J 
expressed similar concerns: 
The Court, although having determined nothing about the activities of 
members of the organisation and nothing about whether the defendant to the 
application has had any connection with criminal activities, is obliged by 
the Act to make [a control] order.61 
Further, Hayne J noted that membership of an association, affiliation with that 
organisation, or association with one or more of its members did not in every 
case demonstrate support for all aims and objectives of the group, or any 
methods it engaged to achieve those aims and objectives.62 Hayne J said that 
‘a central and informing principle of criminal liability in Australia, as 
elsewhere, is that guilt is personal and individual’.63 
                                                 
57 Ibid 88–9. He noted that membership, affiliation or association with an organisation or some 
of its members did not in every case demonstrate support for the aims and purposes of the 
organisation, and emphasised that traditionally in the legal system, guilt was individual and 
personal: at 90. 
58 Ibid 52 (French CJ), 172 (Kiefel J). The United States Supreme Court had originally stated 
that the reputation of courts could not be borrowed by political branches to ‘cloak their work 
in the neutral colours of judicial action’: United States v Mistretta 488 US 361, 407 (1989). 
59 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 154. 
60 Ibid 160. 
61 Ibid 168. 
62 Ibid 90. 
63 Ibid. 
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In summary, the essential points made by the majority of the High Court in 
Totani are that the court will have concerns where: 
(a) no reasons have been given for the executive declaration; 
(b) the exercise of the power by the court takes place independently of a 
finding that a person subject to it ever engaged or was likely to 
engage in criminal behaviour; 
(c) the executive provides an essential circumstance for the making of a 
control order; and 
(d) whilst there is no absolute prohibition on legislation declaring a fact 
and then requiring a court to act on that fact, its validity hinged on a 
question of degree, and such a law has the potential to undermine the 
institutional integrity of a court, particularly if a significant part of the 
overall facts to be determined was declared (deemed) by parliament. 
Circumstance (d) is of greatest constitutional importance. The wording of (d) 
makes clear again that the constitutional difficulty with the legislation in 
Totani was not simply the fact that a member of the executive made the 
declaration. Rather, the constitutional difficulty in terms of Chapter III 
requirements was created by the interaction between that fact and the 
subsequent role played by the court, that role being, in effect, to rubber-stamp 
the action of a member of the executive. 
The application of this summary to the offence contained in section 60A of 
the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) will now be considered. 
1 Section 60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) in the light 
of Totani 
The offence created by section 60A requires the following to be shown: 
(a) the relevant organisation has been declared to be a criminal 
organisation, such declaration having been made by the 
Attorney;64 
                                                 
64 The Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) provides no criteria by which, or explanation of how, the 26 
organisations declared were assessed. However, s 38 refers to criteria for how future 
assessments will be made, which provides some guidance. These criteria include: evidence of 
any link between the entity and serious criminal activity, any criminal convictions of 
participants in, or associates of participants in, the association; evidence that participants are 
involved or have been involved in criminal behaviour; evidence relating to criminal activity of 
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(b) the person charged is a ‘participant’ in that organisation, 
participant being defined broadly to include a person 
asserting or advertising membership of such an association, 
one who seeks to be a member, who attends more than one 
meeting, or who takes part in the affairs of the organisation; 
(c) the person is knowingly present in a public place; and 
(d)  the person is with two other participants in the organisation. 
Obviously, there are real factual similarities between the control order regime 
considered in Totani — making it a crime to associate with other members of 
an organisation declared criminal by the Attorney — and the ‘participation’ 
offence now found in section 60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) — 
making it, amongst other things, a crime to associate with other members of 
an organisation declared by the legislature to be criminal. 
Applying the above summary of the Court’s concerns in Totani to section 
60A, it is clear that just as in Totani the executive did not provide an 
explanation for the declaration, under section 60A there is no need for such an 
explanation. A critical concern of all the majority judges in Totani was that 
the making of the control order by the court was independent of a finding that 
the person the subject of the order had ever engaged in, or was ever likely to 
engage in, criminal behaviour. A similar concern exists with section 60A. 
None of the above elements of a crime under section 60A require any 
evidence that the person charged had ever engaged in, or would in future 
engage in, criminal behaviour (apart from the alleged crime under section 
60A). In relation to the third factor — that the executive provides an essential 
circumstance for the making of the order — the executive provides in section 
60A a critical aspect of the offence, deeming the organisation to be a ‘criminal 
organisation’. And whilst this is not necessarily fatal to constitutional 
validity,65 its prime importance in the scheme of things, and the relative ease 
of proving the other elements, suggest that the court’s institutional integrity is 
                                                                                                                    
overseas or interstate chapters of the organisation; and anything else the Minister believes is 
relevant. As noted earlier, the 2009 Act gave the court the potential to make such a 
declaration, but this power was never actually used, and it seems that the government’s 
preferred mode of operation now is simply to directly declare organisations. 
65 ‘If the satisfaction of a condition enlivening the court’s statutory duty depends upon a 
decision made by a member of the Executive branch of government, it does not necessarily 
follow that the Parliament has thereby authorised the Executive to infringe impermissibly 
upon the judicial power’: International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319, 352 citing 
Palling v Corfield (1970) 123 CLR 52, 58–9 (Barwick CJ), 62 (McTiernan J), 64–5 
(Menzies J), 65 (Windeyer J) agreeing with other members of the Court at 67 (Owen J), 69–
70 (Walsh J), 70 (Gibbs J). 
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being compromised because it has not been left with meaningful judicial work 
to do. Crennan and Bell JJ objected in Totani to a court being required to give 
effect to the determination of the executive without undertaking any 
independent curial determination or adjudication of the claim that a person 
posed a risk in terms of the Act’s objects. As a result, the court was 
effectively an instrument of the executive; the independence of the court was 
undermined.66 
Similarly in section 60A, in the words of Crennan and Bell JJ in Totani, it can 
be argued that the court is left with little meaningful judicial work to do. 
Whilst it must be satisfied that an individual is (a) a participant (b) knowingly 
present in a public place (c) with two other participants, the court is required 
to act on the basis of the legislature’s determination that there is sufficient 
criminal activity surrounding a particular organisation that it warrants being 
declared to be criminal (in terms of the objectives of the Act, as Crennan and 
Bell JJ emphasised in Totani). Furthermore, the court must act on the 
legislature’s determination that anyone within the definition of ‘participant’ in 
relation to a declared organisation is sufficiently likely to be involved in the 
commission of, or the planned commission of, a crime, that it would be 
consistent with the objects of the legislation (again, Crennan and Bell JJ in 
Totani) to criminalise that very act of association. The issue of ascertaining 
the extent to which the court order in a particular case would further the 
objectives of the relevant legislation is also a feature of the judgment of 
Hayne J in Totani.67 
In seeking to apply the justices’ comments about the importance of a judge 
being able to determine independently whether the court order would in a 
given case assist in meeting the objectives of the legislation, it is somewhat 
difficult to ascertain the precise reason for the introduction of sections 60A–
60C into the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). These amendments were introduced 
in the compendium Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) 
Amendment Act 2013 (Qld). There is little in the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying that legislation that elaborates on the precise reasons for the 
criminalisation of association, beyond rhetoric about a ‘zero tolerance 
crackdown on criminal gangs’ and, perhaps, the title of the Act itself. No 
explanation appears as to why the 26 motorcycle clubs were chosen for 
‘declaration’. (This is obviously relevant to the operation of section 60A, 
because it criminalises the act of association amongst participants in a 
‘declared’ organisation). This makes it difficult (or impossible) for a court to 
                                                 
66 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 160. 
67 ‘The Court is required to make a control order without inquiring how, if at all, the order will 
contribute to the legislative object of disrupting the criminal activities of identified groups, or 
the criminal activities of any individual’: ibid 89. 
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independently assess whether finding particular ‘participants’ in a declared 
organisation guilty of a crime under section 60A would in fact assist in 
achieving the ‘zero tolerance crackdown on criminal gangs’ apparently sought 
by the Queensland government, which raises constitutional difficulties, 
according to the express words of Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in Totani. 
Hayne J, in explaining his decision to invalidate the legislation due to Chapter 
III incompatibility, concluded:  
It is not the business of the courts, acting at the behest of the executive, to 
create … norms of conduct without inquiring about what the subject of that 
norm has done, or may do in the future. To be required to do so is repugnant 
to the institutional integrity of the courts.68 
Similarly here, in the words of Hayne J in Totani, the court is being required 
to create a norm of conduct (to find a person associating with others guilty of 
a crime) without inquiring at least in substance about what they have done or 
will do.69 Hayne J expressed (constitutional) concern in Totani with 
legislation that restricted an individual’s freedom of association ‘where 
neither the executive nor the judicial branch has made any determination 
about what he or she has done, intends to do, or is likely to do, in connection 
with serious criminal activity’.70 Surely this concern is also aroused by section 
60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). Neither the executive nor judiciary has 
made any determination about what the individual liable to conviction under 
the section has done, will do, or is likely to do, in connection with crime. Any 
assessment by the legislature was of the declared organisation, rather than any 
particular ‘participant’ in the affairs of the organisation. Further, the Act 
defines ‘participant’ broadly to include, amongst other things, a person 
holding membership of a declared organisation. Yet Hayne J in Totani 
specifically found that: 
Membership of an organisation, affiliation with that organisation or 
association with one or more of its members does not in every case 
demonstrate support for all of the aims and purposes of the group, or all of 
the methods that it uses to achieve its aims or purpose … the conclusion is 
                                                 
68 Ibid 89. 
69 In other words, the court is not asked to determine whether the individuals have associated 
for the purposes of planning future criminal activity, or will in future do so. The inquiry is 
limited to whether they are participants in a declared organisation, and have knowingly met at 
least two participants of such organisation publicly. It is not fatal to invalidity that the court is 
left with some work to do. For instance, in Totani, the court had to determine whether the 
individual was in fact a member of the organisation declared by the Attorney-General. This 
did not save the legislation from invalidity. 
70 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 84–5. 
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not inevitable, and is all the harder to draw as the premise for it varies from 
active membership, through affiliation to mere association with members.71 
The definition of ‘participant’, which enlivens the section 60A offence of 
associating, is even broader than ‘member’, including those asserting 
membership or association with the organisation, those seeking to become 
members, and those who attend more than one meeting of the association. It is 
even harder to show here that criminalising such activities is conducive to the 
purpose of the legislation, relevant to constitutionality, in the express opinion 
of Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in Totani, than it was in Totani itself. The 
section suffers from the same defect that Hayne J identified in Totani, that of 
legislation enlisting the court in creating new standards of behaviour for 
individuals (participants) not because of what they have done, may do or will 
do, but because ‘the Executive has chosen them’.72 Surely a very similar 
observation may also fairly be made about section 60A, though there the 
legislature did the choosing. The constitutional defect remains. 
Section 60A(2), containing a defence to the offence, needs to be pointed out. 
It reflects a reverse onus, creating a defence if the accused can show that the 
organisation declared by the executive to be criminal does not in fact have, as 
at least one of its purposes, the commission of crime. However, this does 
nothing to resolve the concern of the judges in Totani, referred to in the 
previous paragraph, that the action of the court in convicting the accused for 
associating was independent of a finding that the person the subject of the 
charge had ever actually engaged in criminal behaviour or that this was the 
purpose of the association. 
Nothing in the High Court decision in Pompano is inconsistent with the above 
argument. As indicated, that case dealt with provisions of the Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), which provided that the court had power (and 
discretion) to make the order declaring the organisation to be criminal. In that 
sense, the legislation was like that considered, and validated, by the High 
Court in Thomas v Mowbray. It is submitted that the legislation considered 
here is quite different in nature. 
For this reason, the precedent in Totani may assist in the argument that the 
2013 changes are contrary to the requirements of Chapter III. 
                                                 
71 Ibid 90. 
72 Ibid 93. 
2014 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ‘WAR’ ON BIKIES 71 
B The Nature of the Power Declaring an Organisation 
to be a ‘Criminal Organisation’ 
Another contentious constitutional question concerns the nature of a power 
declaring an organisation to be a ‘criminal organisation’. This arises because 
in the original Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) this was a power 
exercised by the court. In contrast, the latest amendments allow the legislature 
to declare organisations to be ‘criminal organisations’. The declarations have 
the same effect as the court order; they are a necessary antecedent to an 
eventual charge that members of the organisation are associating, contrary to 
either the Act or section 60A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), for example. 
The question thus arises of the nature of such a power. Clearly, separation of 
powers questions arise, because in one iteration the power was given to a 
court; in the other, the power was exercised by the legislature. 
An argument exists to counter constitutional concern with the fact that 
essentially the same power has been given, on the one hand, to the judiciary, 
and on the other hand, at a later time, to the legislature. This is the so-called 
‘chameleon doctrine’ which suggests that while there are powers that are 
clearly judicial in nature, and there are powers that are clearly non-judicial in 
nature, there is a ‘grey area’ of powers which may plausibly be exercised by a 
range of bodies. In such cases, the nature of the power is determined by the 
body to whom the power has been entrusted.73 However, care must be taken 
with this doctrine, lest the Boilermakers admonition be subverted by an 
essentially positivistic approach whereby the nature of power is determined by 
what the legislator conferring the power says it is, rather than being 
determined by a substance approach which considers the true nature of the 
power.74 
1 Nature of Judicial Power 
As indicated, judges have been notoriously reluctant to exhaustively define 
the nature of judicial power. The typical starting point is the statement of 
Griffith CJ in Huddart Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead that: 
[T]he words ‘judicial power’ as used in sec 71 of the Constitution mean the 
power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide 
                                                 
73 R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers’ Federation (1957) 100 CLR 277, 305 
(Kitto J); Re Dingjan; Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323, 360 (Gaudron J); Thomas v 
Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 326 (Gleeson CJ). 
74 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 426–7 (Kirby J, dissenting), 466–7 (Hayne J, 
dissenting). 
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controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, 
whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property.75  
Typically, an important feature of judicial power is the fact that it determines 
a controversy between parties by the application of existing (legal) standards 
to facts.76 In contrast, if a power determines what legal rights and obligations 
should be created in future, this might indicate that non-judicial power is 
being exercised.77 Another feature of the exercise of judicial power is its final 
and conclusive nature.78 
In Thomas v Mowbray, the question arose of whether legislation empowering 
a court to make a control order offended the requirements of Chapter III of the 
Constitution. The court was empowered to make the order if it was satisfied 
on the balance of probabilities either that the making of the order would 
substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or that the person had 
provided training to, or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation, 
provided the court was satisfied that the contents of the control order were 
reasonably necessary, and appropriate and adapted, to protect the public from 
a terrorist act. A control order could, amongst other restrictions, include 
provisions restricting the ability of a person subject to it from communicating 
or associating with nominated individuals. It was a gaolable offence to 
contravene a control order. Part of the constitutional challenge to the 
legislation was that the provision empowered a court to exercise power that 
was non-judicial in nature, contrary to the requirements of Chapter III. There 
is obviously some analogy between the making of a control order like this, 
and the criminal ‘participation’ provisions currently being considered, in that 
both criminalise an act of association. 
A majority of the High Court in Thomas v Mowbray found that the making of 
a control order was an exercise of a power that was judicial in nature. The 
majority acknowledged that the concepts the court was required to apply — 
including concepts such as whether the control order was reasonably 
necessary to protect the public, and whether the control order would 
substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act — were broad. However, there 
were many other instances where the courts were required to apply broad 
                                                 
75 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. 
76 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188–90; R v Trade Practices 
Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361, 375. 
77 Precision Date Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 189. 
78 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 355 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
2014 THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ‘WAR’ ON BIKIES 73 
standards; of itself, this breadth did not mean the power was non-judicial.79 
The court was also satisfied that the proceedings for the issue of a control 
order raised a ‘justiciable controversy’80 and involved the application of legal 
criteria to facts, hallmarks of a judicial process. If further justification was 
required, some justices commented that it was ‘a good thing’ that powers 
affecting the liberty of the individual be exercised by members of the 
judiciary, rather than a non-judicial body or individual.81 
2 Nature of Power to ‘Declare an Organisation’ 
As indicated above, all members of the High Court sitting in Pompano 
validated the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) in its original form. It 
will be recalled that the legislation provided that the court could declare an 
organisation to be a criminal organisation, based on given criteria.82 There 
were serious consequences of such a declaration. Presumably all members of 
the Court believed in that case that the making of the declaration was an 
exercise of judicial power, otherwise issues could have arisen with the 
separation of powers principle.83 
French CJ specifically rejected an argument that section 10(1)(c), by 
permitting the court to take into account the extent to which the organisation 
was an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the community, did 
not involve the exercise of judicial power.84 He acknowledged that the 
‘unacceptable risk’ criterion was a broad one, but that this was not fatal to a 
finding that the power was judicial in nature.85 Further, responding to an 
argument that the declaration was non-judicial, French CJ agreed that the 
declaration did not have any coercive operation. However, it would have 
                                                 
79 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 331–2 (Gleeson CJ), 345 (Gummow and 
Crennan JJ), 507 (Callinan J), 526 (Heydon J); cf Kirby J (446), Hayne J (468) dissenting. 
80 Ibid 344 (Gummow and Crennan JJ), 507 (Callinan J), 526 (Heydon J). 
81 Ibid 329 (Gleeson CJ), 507 (Callinan J), 526 (Heydon J). 
82 These were: (a) the respondent was an organisation; (b) members of the organisation 
associate for the purpose of engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, serious criminal activity; 
and (c) the organisation was an unacceptable risk to the safety, welfare or order of the 
community (ss 10(1)(a)–(c) respectively). 
83 This is a reference to the Kable principle. This argument will be elaborated upon below. Of 
the judges in Totani, only French CJ specifically considered whether the relevant power was 
judicial or not. There is some debate about the application of separation of powers principles 
at a state level, compared with application of the principles at the federal level. The High 
Court has often suggested that the separation requirement is stricter at the federal level, 
compared with the state level where some laws clearly infringing the principle might 
nevertheless be found constitutionally valid. 
84 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 [21]. 
85 Ibid [24]. 
74 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 19 NO 1 
significant legal consequences for the organisation and its members.86 It 
provided a foundation for the making of a control order which would 
significantly affect the common law freedoms of individuals.87 These facts 
fortified his Honour’s conclusion that the nature of the power was judicial, 
rather than non-judicial.88 French CJ’s comments express sentiments similar 
to those expressed in earlier cases that it is sound that the exercise of powers 
with significant impacts on human rights be considered judicial in nature, and 
that such exercise should enliven the due process requirements typically 
associated with the judicial process.89  
The recent High Court decision of Momcilovic v The Queen90 considered the 
nature of a power of declaration, and is of some use here. This is despite the 
very different nature of the declaration in that case (to the effect that a 
statutory provision could not be interpreted consistently with a human right) 
compared with the type of declaration presently under discussion (that an 
organisation is criminal, with attendant serious consequences in a number of 
Acts). A further complication is that the judges differed significantly in how 
they viewed the declaratory power in that case.91 Nevertheless, one of the 
reasons that French CJ gave for concluding that the power of declaration in 
Momcilovic was non-judicial in nature was that the declaration did not enable 
or support or facilitate the exercise by the court of its judicial function.92 
Obviously, this can be contrasted with the provision currently under 
discussion. Heydon J considered the ‘highly general, indeterminate, lofty, 
aspirational and abstract’ language used to describe the power in determining 
that the power was non-judicial in nature;93 and Bell J found that the criteria 
used for exercise of the power were typically those considered by a court in 
the traditional judicial process.94  
                                                 
86 Ibid [25]. 
87 Ibid [30]. 
88 Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ did not expressly address this point. 
89 For example, Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 329 (Gleeson CJ); Fardon (2004) 
223 CLR 575, 586 (Gleeson CJ). 
90 (2011) 245 CLR 1 (‘Momcilovic’). 
91 Ibid 67 (French CJ), 96 (Gummow J), 123 (Hayne J), 170 (Heydon J), where they concluded 
that the power of declaration in that context was non-judicial in nature; Crennan and Kiefel JJ 
found that it was ancillary to the exercise of judicial power (at 227) and Bell J seemed to 
suggest that it was judicial in nature (at 250). 
92 Ibid 66. 
93 Ibid 170. This is again in contrast with the criteria for the exercise of the declaration here, at 
least as evidenced in the original Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld), given that no new 
criteria were provided by which the 26 named organisations were assessed. 
94 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 250. It is argued that the criteria in the original Criminal 
Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) are of a nature that a court would typically consider. 
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The argument then is that, in substance, the power to declare an organisation 
criminal, because of its impact on the liberties of individuals affected, is either 
a judicial power or ancillary to the exercise of a judicial power, and should be 
reposed in the judicial arm of government, rather than the legislative arm. A 
purported exercise of such power by the legislature is offensive to Chapter III 
requirements. 
However, even if the power to make a declaration is ‘judicial’ in the relevant 
sense, is there anything prohibiting such a power from being exercised by the 
legislature? Clearly, such an exercise would be impermissible at the federal 
level; however, it is clear that the separation of powers doctrine is of more 
limited application at state level. 
One view of the federal/state difference, expressed by McHugh J in Fardon, is 
that:  
[There is nothing] in the Constitution that would preclude the States from 
legislating so as to empower non-judicial tribunals to determine issues of 
criminal guilt or to sentence offenders for breaches of the law.95 
On the other hand, it is not clear that other members of the High Court have 
accepted this position.96 For instance, in Totani, one of the arguments made to 
the Court was precisely that it was open to a state legislature to authorise a 
body other than a court to exercise judicial power. Gummow J specifically 
cited the page number from the judgment of McHugh J in Fardon, on which 
the quote above appears, in connection with that argument. He then responded 
that these were ‘large propositions for an intervener to advance’, and whilst 
accepting the possibility that state legislatures may confer at least some 
judicial power on a body that is not a court of a state, he specifically did not 
accept the proposition that a body other than court could, for instance, punish 
criminal guilt, a function typically conducted by a court.97 To the extent that 
the argument that the separation of powers principle has more limited 
application at state level than at federal level is based on the finding in the 
                                                 
95 (2004) 223 CLR 575, 600. McHugh J expressed similar sentiments in Kable: ‘The Parliament 
of New South Wales has the constitutional power to pass legislation providing for the 
imprisonment of a particular individual’: Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 121. 
96 In Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 627 Kirby J (in dissent) expressed concern that a broad view 
of the difference between the operation of the separation of powers doctrine at federal or state 
level should not undermine the integrated nature of the Australian court structure.  
97 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 67. Members of the High Court in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 referred to the ‘exclusively judicial function of adjudging 
and punishing criminal guilt’ (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ), though admittedly this was in 
the context of a federal law. The extent to which these judges would apply the same sentiment 
to the state level is not entirely clear. They did not expressly confine it to federal courts. 
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BLF98 case of a lack of separation of powers in state constitutions, some have 
challenged the continuing correctness of that decision, in light of subsequent 
decisions.99 It has, however, never been formally overruled. 
Thus, it may fairly be said that there is some uncertainty as to the precise 
application of the separation of powers doctrine at state level, and in particular 
the extent to which a function that is judicial can be conferred or exercised by 
a non-judicial body. 
Perhaps a stronger way to articulate this argument is to acknowledge that state 
laws which compromise the institutional integrity of state courts will be 
invalid due to the requirements of Chapter III. Specifically, powers may not 
be given to a court, or members of a court, by which its institutional integrity 
is or may be compromised.100 A court cannot be required to perform a task 
that is inconsistent with its institutional integrity.101 Chapter III requires that 
there be a body fitting the description of a ‘state supreme court’. This 
requires, for instance, that the body have the power to correct jurisdictional 
error of inferior courts,102 and to provide reasons for its decisions.103 The 
removal of such power triggered Chapter III constitutional invalidity. As 
Ratnapala and Crowe write: 
The case of Kirk establishes that institutional integrity also prevents state 
legislatures from withdrawing certain types of jurisdiction from state 
courts.104 
                                                 
98 Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers’ Federation of New South Wales 
v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372 (‘BLF’). 
99 ‘It has been the longstanding judicial view, repeatedly affirmed by state supreme courts, the 
High Court and the Privy Council, that the doctrine of the separation of powers is not 
constitutionally entrenched at state level. This orthodox view, we argue, no longer represents 
the constitutional law of Australia following a series of judgments of the High Court 
commencing with Kable’: Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 27, 176. The present author has 
developed an argument that the BLF decision should be overturned: see Anthony Gray, 
‘Executive Detention and the Australian Constitution’ (2014) Australian Journal of 
Administrative Law (forthcoming). Further, contrary to the decision in BLF, French CJ and 
Kiefel J specifically stated in Wainohu that a state legislature could not now, consistent with 
ch III, enact a law purporting to abolish the Supreme Court of a state: Wainohu (2011) 243 
CLR 181, 210. 
100 Forge (2006) 228 CLR 45, 67 (Gleeson CJ), 76 (Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ) 122 
(Kirby J); Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1. 
101 New South Wales v Kable (2013) 87 ALJR 737 [17] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, 
Bell and Keane JJ). 
102 Kirk (2010) 239 CLR 531. 
103 Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181. 
104 Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 27, 189. 
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It may be conceded here that the removal of a power to declare an 
organisation to be criminal in nature is not as clear an example of a breach of 
Chapter III requirements as the legislation discussed in Kirk or Wainohu. It is 
hard to argue that the ability to exercise such a power is an ‘essential 
characteristic’ of a court. 
On the other hand, the precise contours of the ‘institutional integrity’ test are 
not clear at this point. It may not be necessary, in order to meet this test, that 
an ‘essential characteristic’ of a court be implicated by the legislation. There 
have been recent suggestions that any substantial change to the kinds of 
power traditionally exercised by a court, and any substantial change to the 
kinds of power traditionally exercised by a legislature might trigger Chapter 
III concerns at a state level; prime examples of such changes include the 
conferral of non-judicial powers on the judiciary, or the exercise of judicial 
powers by non-judicial figures. For example, some members of the High 
Court in Momcilovic found that the conferral of what were considered non-
judicial powers on a court offended its institutional integrity.105 Gummow J 
(dissenting, but with whom Hayne J agreed on this point) noted that the 
powers given to the court represented a ‘significant change to the 
constitutional relationship between the arms of government’,106 finding that 
the powers given to the judiciary in that case were essentially legislative in 
nature. This led him to a finding of constitutional invalidity. Importantly, the 
context was a state law conferring power on a state court.107 
A similar position was taken by Heydon J in Momcilovic. He first 
characterised the nature of the power being exercised. Given the kinds of 
factors that those granting the power contemplated would be taken into 
account (in his words, ‘indeterminate, lofty, aspirational, abstract’ and 
involving questions of public interest), he concluded that an exercise of 
legislative power had been contemplated. This led him to a conclusion of 
constitutional invalidity: 
[Section] 7(2) creates difficult tasks. It imposes them on judges. But they 
are not tasks for judges. They are tasks for a legislature. Section 7(2) reveals 
that the Victorian legislature has failed to carry out for itself the tasks it 
describes. Instead of doing that, it has delegated them to the judiciary.108 
                                                 
105 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1. 
106 Ibid 95–6 (emphasis added).  
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid 172. 
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For Heydon J also, this led to a finding of constitutional invalidity, in that a 
state law purported to confer powers, which should have been exercised by 
the legislature, on a state court. 
In other words, three members of the High Court recently determined that the 
conferral of what it classified as powers that were in substance non-judicial on 
a judicial body was offensive to the requirements of Chapter III because it 
interfered with the court’s institutional integrity. The judicial body involved 
was a state court. 
Surely what can be said about the conferral of ‘unusual’ powers on a court, 
can also be said about the conferral of ‘unusual’ powers on the legislature.109 
As a corollary of the principle espoused by Gummow and Hayne JJ in 
Momcilovic, it can also be argued that the removal of the power of the court to 
declare an organisation to be criminal, and the exercise of that power by the 
legislature, represents a ‘significant change to the constitutional relationship 
between the arms of government’.110 
This is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that a power of that nature was 
given to the judiciary in the Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld). It was 
then ‘re-allocated’ to the legislature by amending legislation in 2013. In the 
present author’s opinion, that does answer the description of a ‘significant 
change to the constitutional relationship between the arms of government’.111 
The legislature is seeking to appropriate for itself a power to make an order 
which has very significant effects on individuals, a type of power that 
numerous judges have expressed to be ‘best’ reposed in the judiciary. To 
adapt the above quoted judgment of Heydon J in Momcilovic, the 2013 
amendments allocate to the legislature the task of declaring an organisation 
criminal. But it is not a task for the legislature; it is a task for the courts. 
If it is accepted that the power to declare an organisation to be criminal is 
really ‘judicial’ in nature, and should, given its impact on fundamental civil 
liberties, be reposed in the judiciary, then its removal from the judiciary, and 
placement with the legislature, compromises the institutional integrity of a 
court. This is not to say that the exercise of judicial power by a non-judicial 
body will never be permissible, particularly at state level. It is rather to say 
that it is a question of degree, and there will be a stage where the removal of 
what is essentially a judicial power to a non-judicial body will offend the 
institutional integrity of the court. That this is the current law in this area can 
                                                 
109 The word ‘unusual’ is used here to mean powers that one would not typically expect the 
body to be exercising. 
110 Momcilovic (2011) 245 CLR 1, 95–6 (Gummow J, with whom Hayne J agreed). 
111 Ibid. 
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be concluded from the judgment of Gummow J in Totani and the High Court 
decision in Wainohu. Support for these conclusions can be drawn from the 
judgments of Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Momcilovic. 
C The Court’s Obligation to Act Fairly 
The joint reasons of Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Pompano agreed 
with the proposition that a court was required to act fairly and impartially, in 
order that its institutional integrity not be compromised.112 In addressing this 
requirement, these judges placed critical importance on the ability of judges in 
the prescribed process to take into account the circumstances in which 
evidence in support of the application for a declaration was obtained: 
In deciding any application for declaration of an organisation as a criminal 
organisation, the Supreme Court would know that evidence of those 
assertions and allegations that constituted criminal intelligence had not been 
and could not be challenged directly. The Court would know that the 
respondent and its members could go no further than make general denials 
of any wrongdoing of the kind alleged. What weight to give to that evidence 
would be a matter for the Court to judge … noticing that the Supreme Court 
must take account of the fact that a respondent cannot controvert criminal 
intelligence does not seek to deny the allegation of legislative invalidity by 
asserting that the Supreme Court can be ‘relied on’ to remedy any 
constitutional infirmity or deficiency in the legislative scheme. Rather it 
points to the fact that under the impugned provisions the Supreme Court 
retains its capacity to act fairly and impartially. Retention of the Court’s 
capacity to act fairly and impartially is critical to its continued institutional 
integrity.113 
The joint reasons contrasted the legislation invalidated in Wainohu with the 
Queensland Criminal Organisation Act, concluding that the Queensland 
legislation ‘did not in any way alter the duty of the Supreme Court to assess 
the cogency and veracity of the evidence that is tendered in an application for 
a declaration of an organisation as a criminal organisation’.114 
Further, the joint reasons expressed the belief that the legislation was 
consistent with the requirement of institutional integrity because the court was 
empowered to weigh up evidence, including the circumstances in which it was 
                                                 
112 Pompano (2013) 295 ALR 638, [167] (joint reasons); [194] (Gageler J). This mirrors 
comments in earlier cases observing that fairness is a characteristic of a judicial process: eg 
Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 225 (Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan and Bell JJ). 
113 Pompano (2013) 295 ALR 638 [166]–[167]. 
114 Ibid [168]. 
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obtained and the opportunity (or lack thereof) of those affected to hear and 
counter evidence being led against them, in assessing whether a declaration 
that the organisation was criminal should be made. This ensured that the 
judges could act fairly.115 In similar cases, one of the reasons why the High 
Court validated the legislation was the retention of court discretion, in 
particular the extent to which it was required to accept submissions or 
assertions by members of the executive.116 
The new provisions stand in marked contrast to the earlier provisions in this 
respect. By directly declaring an organisation to be criminal, the legislation 
removes the power of the court to weigh up the evidence said to suggest that 
the organisation is worthy of such a declaration. This has serious 
consequences.117 The court will not see such evidence. It is required to act on 
the declaration by the legislature that the organisation meets the criteria for 
the making of such an order. Nothing specific is contained in the Act or 
Explanatory Memorandum indicating what led the 26 organisations to be 
declared criminal. Therefore, we are left with the criteria contained in the 
original legislation, or with the indicators contained in the 2013 legislation 
regarding why an organisation might be declared in future, as guides to how 
the power was/will be exercised. However, the court is not empowered to 
overturn the legislature’s decision. A critical piece of the original legislation, 
the piece which justified the High Court’s decision in Pompano that the 
legislation was compatible with the court’s institutional integrity, has been 
                                                 
115 This was also a feature of the High Court’s reasoning in cases such as Gypsy Jokers 
Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 (‘Gypsy Jokers’) and K-
Generation v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501. 
116 K-Generation v Liquor Licensing Court (2009) 237 CLR 501, 543: ‘[T]he … Court is not 
bound to accept in its terms the “criminal intelligence” upon which the Police Commissioner 
relies. The Court itself may question the evidence in closed session’ (Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). Another important consideration in the joint reasons was 
that, even if the court did accept the evidence produced by the Commissioner, it could 
independently determine the weight to be given to it (at 543). French CJ expressed similar 
sentiments: ‘[T]here is nothing in [the legislative provision] requiring the … Court to accept 
or act upon information submitted to it by the Commissioner of Police’ (at 527) … ‘[T]he … 
Court can look behind the Police Commissioner’s classification of information as criminal 
intelligence to determine whether it meets the objective criteria upon which that classification 
must be based’ (at 531). French CJ added that ‘[t]here is nothing to prevent an applicant faced 
with unseen “criminal intelligence” from tendering comprehensive evidence about his or her 
own good character and associations’ (at 527); Pompano (2013) 87 ALJR 458. 
117 Clearly the courts do not like having their discretion removed. For instance, in Gypsy Jokers 
(2008) 234 CLR 532, the majority found that the legislation was valid only because it inferred 
that the court retained a power to second guess the determination of a member of the 
executive that relevant evidence should remain confidential. Kirby J (dissenting) did not read 
the legislation this way, claiming that it was really intended to make the executive’s decision 
on the confidentiality of certain evidence final and binding on the court. For this reason, he 
found that the legislation was contrary to the requirements of ch III. 
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removed, surely raising serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the 
new laws. The legislation suffers from the fatal constitutional defect identified 
in Totani, that of requiring a court to make orders without undertaking any 
independent curial determination or adjudication of the claim.118  
1 Analogy with Conclusiveness Certificates? 
Some analogy is apparent with the issues raised in Conway v Rimmer119 (a 
precedent adopted by the High Court)120 where the House of Lords considered 
the validity of a ministerial declaration that documents would not be produced 
to a litigant in proceedings against the Crown, on the basis that production 
would be contrary to the public interest. A unanimous court found that it was 
for the court, and not for the executive, to decide whether the public interest 
justified disclosure or non-disclosure of the material. Members of the court 
expressed grave concern with a minister deciding whether or not disclosure 
would be permitted, something which could impair due administration of 
justice.121 Courts had exercised this power of weighing up competing 
considerations in favour of or against disclosure for many years.122 Lord 
Morris stated that a system whereby the court would be bound by a ministerial 
statement that disclosure was contrary to the public interest would be ‘out of 
harmony with the spirit which in this country has guided the ordering of our 
affairs and in particular the administration of justice’.123 Lord Pearce agreed 
that it was up to the court to decide what evidence it shall demand in the 
fulfilment of its public duty to administer justice.124 
Again, some analogy exists with the situation in Attorney-General (Cth) v Tse 
Chu-Fai,125 involving interpretation of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and, in 
particular, the definition of an ‘extradition country’. In the context of a 
                                                 
118 In finding the legislation in Totani invalid, Crennan and Bell JJ noted that ‘[t]he conditions 
upon which the Court must make a control order require the Court to give effect to the 
determination of the Executive in the declaration (which implements the legislative policy), 
without undertaking any independent curial determination, or adjudication, of the claim or 
premise of an application for a control order by the Commissioner of Police … This has the 
effect of rendering the Court an instrument of the Executive, which undermines its 
independence’: Totani (2010) 242 CLR1, 160); see also at 21 (French CJ), 66 (Gummow 
J66), 89 (Hayne J). 
119 [1968] AC 910. 
120 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, 38 (Gibbs ACJ), 96 (Mason J). 
121 Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910, 951 (Lord Reid). 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid 955 (Lord Morris), 977 (Lord Hodson). 
124 Ibid 980; see also at 994 (Lord Upjohn). 
125 (1998) 193 CLR 128. 
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discussion of the requirements of Chapter III of the Constitution, six members 
of the High Court found that: 
The Executive, a representative of which is a party to a controversy arising 
under the 1988 Act, cannot, by a certificate furnished by another 
representative, ‘compel the court to an interpretation of statutory words 
which it believes to be false’.126  
We see that both in the line of Australian cases dealing with institutional 
integrity, such as Gypsy Jokers, K-Generation, Wainohu and Totani, and the 
public interest immunity cases such as Conway and Sankey, the Court has 
insisted that one of its essential characteristics is its ability to weigh up 
evidence presented by both sides, in deciding upon an application of the law. 
It has frowned on attempts by the executive or legislature to make this 
determination independently of the court. 
It can be seen how the 2013 amendments offend the sentiments expressed in 
these cases. Those amendments purport to interfere with the court’s power to 
weigh up evidence to determine whether or not members of an organisation 
do in fact associate for criminal purposes, do in fact have criminal records, 
and are in fact members of associations which have links with other 
associations interstate or internationally that are involved in crime. A court 
would ordinarily receive evidence on all of these matters, and have the chance 
to weigh it in light of submissions by members of the relevant organisation. 
The 2013 changes short-circuit this by requiring the court to act on the 
declaration by the legislature as to the criminality of the organisation, and by 
making the court abandon its traditional role of weighing up evidence on 
contentious legal issues. In the language of Chapter III, this offends the 
institutional integrity of the court. It takes away from the court a power that it 
traditionally exercised, just as the government purported to do in Conway.  
D Minimum Mandatory Sentencing 
Another aspect of the scheme that is highly constitutionally contentious is the 
provision for minimum mandatory sentencing, exacerbated by the very long 
minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment for which the legislation 
provides.127 The most glaring example appears in the VLAD Act, involving a 
                                                 
126 Ibid 149 (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) (only six judges 
heard the case); the text in inverted commas is the Court in Tse quoting Scarman LJ in In re 
James (An Insolvent) [1977] Ch D 41, 71. 
127 Anthony Gray and Gerard Elmore, ‘The Constitutionality of Minimum Mandatory 
Sentencing Regimes’ (Pt 1) (2012) 22(1) Journal of Judicial Administration 37; Anthony 
Gray and Gerard Elmore, ‘The Constitutionality of Minimum Mandatory Sentencing 
Regimes’ (Pt 2) (2013) 23(2) Journal of Judicial Administration 58. 
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minimum mandatory term imprisonment of 15 years for the commission of 
nominated offences pursuant to the activities of a ‘declared organisation’, or 
25 years’ imprisonment if the person happens to be an office holder in the 
organisation. The person cannot be given parole during this minimum time. 
The minimum time is in addition to any other penalty to be applied for the 
offence. Nominated offences include serious offences, but also include 
relatively trivial offences such as drug possession. 
Are there constitutional difficulties with requiring a court to impose a 
minimum 15-year term of imprisonment on someone convicted of drug 
possession, or 25 years if they are the secretary of a declared organisation? 
One might have thought so. Two strands of the High Court’s Chapter III 
jurisprudence are relevant here. First, the Court has resisted the attempted 
conscription of the judiciary into the implementation of an executive plan.128 
Second, the court has resisted (mandated) departures from the traditional 
judicial process.129 Both indicate an unconstitutional attack on judicial 
independence and the institutional integrity of a Chapter III court. 
Members of the High Court have declared that a law which ‘purport[s] to 
direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of the exercise of their 
jurisdiction’ was offensive to Chapter III.130 One reason that a majority of 
High Court invalidated the legislation in Kable was that it had the effect that 
the  
judiciary is apt to be seen as but an arm of the executive which implements 
the will of the legislature. Thereby a perception is created which trenches 
upon the appearance of institutional impartiality.131 
Surely, a provision requiring the imposition of a minimum gaol term purports 
to direct the court in the exercise of its power to sentence an individual once 
guilt is established. In Totani, Crennan and Bell JJ invalidated the legislation 
partly because: 
                                                 
128 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51; Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1. 
129 International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 319; Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181; Robert 
French, ‘Essential and Defining Characteristics of Courts in an Age of Institutional Change’ 
(2013) 23(1) Journal of Judicial Administration 3. 
130 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 
176 CLR 1, 36–7 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). See also Gypsy Jokers (2008) 234 CLR 
532, 560: ‘[L]egislation which purported to direct the courts as to the manner and outcome of 
the exercise of their jurisdiction would be apt impermissibly to impair the character of the 
courts as independent and impartial tribunals’ (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). 
131 Kable (1996) 189 CLR 51, 134 (Gummow J); to like effect at 98 (Toohey J), 107 (Gaudron 
J), 124 (McHugh J). 
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Legislation which draws a court into the implementation of government 
policy, by confining the court’s adjudicative process so that the court is 
directed or required to implement legislative or executive determinations 
without following ordinary judicial processes, will deprive the court of the 
characteristics of an independent and impartial tribunal.132 
This is surely what legislation imposing minimum mandatory sentences does. 
Clearly, provisions for minimum mandatory sentences are government policy. 
Clearly, the laws direct the courts to implement a legislative or executive 
determination about the appropriate penalty. 
The extract from Crennan and Bell JJ also focuses on the second strand of 
argument by which Chapter III issues are raised, the extent to which the 
legislation mandates departure from traditional judicial process.133 Clearly, 
ordinary judicial process includes an assessment of a just penalty/sentence 
following conviction.134 This involves the weighing up of various matters 
pertaining to an individual’s sentence, including the circumstances of the 
offence, the age of the offender, the reasons for committing the offence, the 
impact on the victim, the offender’s past conduct, any relevant personal or 
family history, and a consideration of past sentences for similar offences. 
There is an overriding need for proportionality between (a) the court’s 
perception of the gravity of the offence and the circumstances in which the 
offender committed it, and (b) the sentence ordered by the court.135 
                                                 
132 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 157. In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 477-8, Hayne J 
had constitutional concern with legislation where ‘federal courts are left with no practical 
choice except to act upon a view proffered by the executive’, stating that such legislation 
would damage the institutional integrity and maintenance of public confidence in the 
judiciary. 
133 ‘[L]egislation which requires a court exercising federal jurisdiction to depart to a significant 
degree from the methods and standards which have characterised judicial activities in the past 
may be repugnant to Chapter III’: Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 355 (Gummow 
and Crennan JJ). 
134 ‘The King in his own person cannot adjudge any case, either criminal or betwixt party and 
party; but it ought to be determined and adjudged in some court of justice, according to the 
law and custom of England’: Prohibitions Del Roy (1607) 12 Co Rep 63; 77 ER 1342. In Chu 
Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ 
(with whom Mason CJ agreed) refer to the ‘exclusively judicial function of adjudging and 
punishing criminal guilt’; Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 609–10 (Gummow J), 
650 (Hayne J); Reyes v The Queen [2002] UKPC 11, [47] (Lord Bingham, for the court, 
stating that a ‘non-judicial body cannot decide what is the appropriate measure of punishment 
to be visited on a defendant for a crime he has committed’).  
135 Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472: ‘The principle of proportionality is 
now firmly established in the country. It was the unanimous view of the Court in Veen (No 1) 
that a sentence should not be increased beyond what is proportionate to the crime in order 
merely to extend the period of protection of society from the risk of recidivism on the part of 
the offender’ (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Wong v The Queen (2001) 207 
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It is submitted that, applying the stated test of Crennan and Bell JJ, such laws 
deprive the court of the features of an independent and impartial tribunal, by 
taking away a significant part of its role in weighing up all of these 
circumstances at the time of sentence, and requiring it to start with a 
government-mandated minimum sentence, in particular a mandated minimum 
sentence that is far higher than what a court would typically order for at least 
some of the offences to which the mandatory minimum sentencing regime 
applies. This view has attracted academic support,136 and is consistent with a 
Privy Council decision.137 
This submission will not be developed any further here because it must be 
acknowledged that in Magaming v The Queen138 (‘Magaming’), six members 
of the High Court validated a mandatory sentencing regime against a Chapter 
III challenge. The joint reasons concluded that the court’s sentencing function 
could only take place in the context of the statutory power conferred upon the 
court, and it was open for the legislature to set the parameters as it saw fit, 
including the introduction of minimum mandatory sentences.139 This was not, 
according to the majority, contrary to the requirements of Chapter III. 
                                                                                                                    
CLR 584, 611–12: ‘the task of the sentence is to take account of all of the relevant factors and 
to arrive at a single result which takes due account of them all’ (Gaudron, Gummow and 
Hayne JJ). 
136 Manderson and Sharp concluded that mandatory sentencing laws ‘are so fundamentally 
different in character as to make a mockery of the courts’ judicial role in the sentencing of 
offenders. It is not the severity of the laws, but their complete and structural abrogation of a 
meaningful judicial role in the infliction of a penalty that subverts the rule of law and is 
thereby an instance of the legislature requiring courts to act in a manner which is incompatible 
with the judicial process’: Desmond Manderson and Naomi Sharp, ‘Mandatory Sentences and 
the Constitution: Discretion, Responsibility and Judicial Process’ (2000) 22 Sydney Law 
Review 585, 605; Peter Sallmann, ‘Mandatory Sentencing: A Bird’s Eye View’ (2005) 14 
Journal of Judicial Administration 177; Andrew Trotter and Harry Hobbs, ‘The Great Leap 
Backward: Criminal Law Reform with the Hon Jarrod Bleijie’ (2014) 36(1) Sydney Law 
Review 1, 12–22. 
137 In Liyanage v The Queen (1965) UKPC 1, the Council invalidated a mandatory sentencing 
regime in relation to those involved in an attempted coup. The Council found that it was 
offensive to the separation of powers for which the relevant country’s Constitution provided: 
‘[T]he judges were deprived of their normal discretion as respects appropriate sentences. They 
were compelled to sentence each offender on conviction to not less than ten years’ 
imprisonment … even though his part in the conspiracy might have been trivial.’ Gageler J 
(dissenting) reached the same conclusion in Magaming (2013) 87 ALJR 1060 [88]–[89] 
though he did so by another route, deciding that in the context where some offences attracted 
mandatory minimum penalties and others did not, the fact that the executive had a choice of 
which route to follow was the encroachment on judicial power, contrary to ch III 
requirements. 
138 (2013) 87 ALJR 1060 (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, Gageler J 
dissenting). 
139 Ibid [47] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ), [103] (Keane J). 
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Of course, it would be extremely unlikely that the High Court would overturn 
this decision in the near future, given the fact that it was made in 2013 and 
was a decision by six justices. The remote possibility exists that the High 
Court might distinguish this decision when it considers the very high 
minimum mandatory sentences provided for in the VLAD Act. The minimum 
non-parole periods of 15 years or 25 years are substantially heavier than the 
minimum sentences provided for in the regime challenged in Magaming, 
which had a minimum non-parole period of three years. It is possible, though 
admittedly unlikely, that the Court would hold that a direction for a court to 
impose such a high minimum sentence so substantially interferes with the 
discretion that a sentencing court typically has that it infringes the 
independence and institutional integrity of the court, by requiring it to impose 
grossly unfair and unjust penalties, bearing no sensible relationship to the 
gravity of the offence. 
Current members of the High Court have acknowledged that fairness is an 
abiding characteristic of a judicial process.140 Surely, there comes a point at 
which a very high minimum mandatory baseline undermines the very fairness 
which a court is sworn to ensure, undermining its institutional integrity. While 
it can be argued that these comments were directed to fairness of process, it 
can also plausibly be argued that a defining feature of courts is fairness of 
outcome. After all, process is a means to an outcome. A clearly unfair 
outcome is of greater practical significance to the parties involved than an 
unfair process. Process must not be reified above outcomes. 
IV CONCLUSION 
During 2013 some remarkable laws were passed with the ostensible purpose 
of ‘dealing with’ outlaw motorcycle clubs. As has been seen at other times 
when governments respond quickly with tough laws to deal with some 
perceived ‘emergency’, human rights that have been long fought for, and 
thought to be won, can become casualties. The High Court needs to be wary 
of its acquiescence in such steps, lest the exceptional become the normal. 
Four constitutional arguments against the 2013 changes have been made in 
this article. First, it has been argued that the provision criminalising 
participation in a declared organisation runs counter to the High Court 
decision in Totani. In particular it runs counter to the evident concern with the 
lack of reasons given for executive decisions, with the requirement that the 
                                                 
140 Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, 43 (French CJ); International Finance Trust (2009) 240 CLR 
319, 338 (French CJ); Wainohu (2011) 243 CLR 181, 208 (French CJ and Kiefel J), 225 
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court to act on a government declaration of an organisation’s criminality, and 
with the criminalisation of an individual in the absence of proof that the 
individual was involved in any wrongdoing. Second, it has been argued that 
the power to declare an organisation criminal, given the consequences of the 
power for individuals involved in the organisation, is essentially judicial in 
nature, as reflected in the original Criminal Organisation Act 2009 (Qld) and 
confirmed by the High Court. As a result, the sudden exercise of the power by 
the legislature in 2013 reflects an impermissible breach of the separation of 
powers doctrine. Third, it has been argued that, by requiring the court to act 
on the legislature’s declaration of 26 motorcycle clubs, the court is being 
required to act contrary to fair process, as that concept has been applied by the 
court itself. Fourth, it has been argued that there is room to constitutionally 
challenge the minimum mandatory regime despite the High Court decision in 
Magaming, given the very high level at which the minimum mandatory 
sentencing provisions have been set.  
